What happened
Home Affairs published Direction 002-2026 on September 29 under the existing PSPF. Accountable authorities must comply. Non-corporate Commonwealth entities must inventory vulnerable legacy technology, maintain a risk-management plan and report completion to Home Affairs by March 31,2027. Entities operating Systems of Government Significance face a December 31,2026 stocktake and specified risk-reduction requirement.
The signed direction also requires attention to rapid patching and resilience. It is a legacy-technology security stocktake, not an inventory of deployed AI models. Agencies retain discretion over assessment scope; a national-security-function reporting exemption may be sought. No new independent provider oversight or funded system replacement is established.
**Potential direction of power:** Mandatory inventories, risk plans and reporting move agency security readiness beyond voluntary intention, preserving public institutions’ ability to govern services exposed to AI-enabled threats. This is bounded public capacity, not a new provider-reporting duty, public challenge right or funded replacement programme.
**Approved October5:** Dispersion +1; Scorecard; Leaning dispersion / Preserves. Lanes 2/6/1.
**Source assessment:** High on the issued direction and binding reporting duties; implementation remains untested. The original October2 research dates remain in history.
**Follow-up:** October 14: explanatory note promised by October 13. January 1: actual December 31 critical-system compliance; April 1,2027: actual March 31 general stocktake, plan and report. Reporting exemptions and implementation outcomes remain qualified.
**Sources:** - [Original source](https://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/publications-library/direction-002-2026-strengthening-commonwealth-cyber-posture-against-ai-enabled-risks) - [Primary document / implementation source](https://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/system/files/2026-09/pspf-direction-002-2026_0.pdf)
Potential direction of power
Leaning dispersion · Dispersion +1
Mandatory system inventories, risk planning and reporting give public agencies a clearer basis for managing exposure to AI-enabled threats. They do not establish new public appeal rights.
Window of contestability
Preserves
The duties preserve agencies’ capacity to identify and address vulnerabilities; implementation and reporting exemptions limit the effect.
